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Abstract 
It is a classical argument against the objectivity of the flow of time that it 
would not be possible to make sense of its direction without stepping 
into a vicious circularity. This paper is dedicated to discuss some of the 
objections Tim Maudlin has recently put forward against this argument, 
while outlining an alternative and more effective way out of it. 
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Introduction 
Time flows — or, at least, it seems to: the present moment is but a 
feeble sparkle, suddenly lighting up while emerging from the future, 
and leaving only pale traces in our memories while fading away into 
the past. But is it all real? Does time really flow or pass independently 
of human experience, or is transiency a mere projection of our 
minds? 
In his latest book, Maudlin 2007 discusses some stock philosophi-
cal arguments Price 1996 endorses to contest the objectivity of the 
flow of time. In particular, one of these arguments targets the claim 
that time flows from past to future, by contending that there is no non-
circular way to determine the direction of its flow: 
If time flowed, then – as with any flow – it would only make sense to 
assign that flow a direction with respect to a choice as to what is to count 
as a positive direction of time. In saying that the sun moves from east to 
west or that the hands of a clock move clockwise, we take for granted 
that the positive time axis lies toward what we call the future. But in the 
absence of some objective grounding for this convention, there isn’t an 
objective fact as to which way the sun or the hands of the clock are 
‘really’ moving. Of course, proponents of the view that there is an ob-
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jective flow of time might see it as an advantage of their view that it does 
provide such an objective basis for the usual choice of temporal coordi-
nate. The problem is that until we have such an objective basis we don’t 
have an objective sense in which time is flowing one way rather than an-
other. In other words, [...] it [...] doesn’t make sense to speak of an ob-
jective direction of flow of time (Price 1996: 13). 
The intent of this paper is to point out the shortcomings of Maudlin’s 
reply to this argument, while outlining an alternative and more 
effective objection to the latter. For this purpose it will be useful, in 
the first place, to outline the logical structure underlying the argu-
ment in question. On the one hand, this will make it possible to see 
that the argument comes necessarily equipped with the implicit 
corollary that the direction of flows is, in general, no objective matter 
of fact. On the other hand, it will make it possible to see that Maud-
lin’s objections fail precisely because he basically accepts the logical 
structure of the argument, leaving its auxiliary premises substantially 
untouched. Finally, I will carry the logical consequences of the argu-
ment one step further, showing that it comes to the unacceptable 
conclusion of denying the objectivity of flows themselves – the sole 
way of avoiding such an extremely implausible contention being 
either relaxing one tacit premise of the argument or falling into an 
illegitimate double standard. 
The No-Direction Argument 
Following Price, but unlike Maudlin, I shall hereafter consider terms 
like ‘flow’, ‘passage’ or ‘motion’ as equivalent, since they bear no 
substantial difference for the purposes of my discussion. Given this 
proviso, the coarse-grained logical structure of Price’s argument – 
hereafter labeled the no-direction argument – can be laid down as 
follows. 
(1) Time flows objectively. 
(2) If time flows objectively, then it flows objectively in a certain di-
rection. 
(3) The direction of flows can only be established by referring to the 
positive direction of the time axis. 
(4) By convention, the positive direction of the time axis points to-
ward the future. 
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(5) The future is objectively distinguished from the past exactly be-
cause it is the objective direction of the flow of time. 
By premises (1) and (2), time objectively flows in a certain direction 
which, according to (3) and (4), can only be established by referring 
to the future. However, given (5), the future direction of time is only 
objectively distinguished from its past direction as the direction 
toward which time objectively moves; and therefore, the direction of 
the flow of time can be only established by circularly referring to the 
objective direction of the flow of time. To escape this circularity, and 
given the plausibility of premises (2)-(4), premise (1) should then be 
relinquished, leading to the conclusion that time does not objectively 
flow. 
Those who deny the objectivity of the flow of time would cer-
tainly be content with this result. However, the argument bears a 
further, though rarely acknowledged, consequence. If there is no 
objective flow of time then, a fortiori, there is no objective direction 
of that flow. Hence, by premise (5), there is no objective distinction 
between the past and the future and, therefore, there is no objective 
direction toward which the time axis can be oriented according to the 
convention laid down in (4). So, given premise (3), not only the no-
direction argument denies the objectivity of the flow of time – it also 
comes to deny the objectivity of the direction of any flow. 
Incidentally, this would be a claim Price would be likely to sub-
scribe. In fact, one of his leading theses is that the direction of causa-
tion, to which the temporal orientation of physical processes is often 
reduced, is but a secondary quality originating from our perspective 
attitude of agents: as deliberating and operating beings, we are natu-
rally inclined to project the purely subjective directionality of the 
means-end relation into the physical world. The origin of the causal 
asymmetry thus lies in our experience ‘of doing one thing to achieve 
another’, in the fact that ‘we cannot reverse the order of things, 
bringing about the second state of affairs in order to achieve the first’ 
(Price 1992: 515). In this view, there is no mind-independent matter 
of fact about the temporal asymmetry of causes and effects, and hence 
no mind-independent matter of fact about whether causal processes, 
including flows, take place in one direction rather than the opposite: 
flows are only objective as long as they involve the displacement of 
the flowing objects; the direction of that displacement, instead, is a 
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purely subjective addition made by human observers. Maudlin’s 
objections, on the other hand, concentrate precisely against this view. 
Maudlin’s Reply 
Contrary to Price, Maudlin believes that time passes objectively: the 
passage of time is ‘an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of 
the world’ – the asymmetry ‘that grounds the distinction between 
sequences which run from past to future and sequences which run 
from future to past’ (Maudlin 2007: 198). In this view, there is more 
about flows and motions than mere displacement: flows and motions 
have an objective direction, and this is precisely the one which is 
determined by the objective passage of time. 
Schematically, Maudlin’s reply to Price can be split in two main 
parts: on the one hand, he argues in favor of the objectivity of the 
flow of time by invoking the empirical evidence of the directionality 
of flows; on the other hand, he argues that the problem of determin-
ing the positive direction of the time axis, which is essential to Price’s 
argument, is ill-posed ab initio. Let us examine these two objections 
separately. 
The point about directionality of flow is [...] exactly correct: flows only 
have a direction because the asymmetry inherent in the passage of time 
provides temporal direction: from past to future. The natural thing is 
now to turn Price’s modus tollens into a modus ponens: since there ob-
viously is a fact about how the Mississippi flows (north to south) or how 
the hands of standard clocks turn (clockwise) there is equally a real dis-
tinction between the future direction in time and the past direction 
(Maudlin 2007: 114). 
Price’s argument is structured as a reductio ad absurdum; so what 
modus tollens does Maudlin refer to? In order to reconstruct it, we 
shall proceed backward, recovering its premises from those of the 
modus ponens that Maudlin wishes to obtain by reversing its logical 
structure. 
The conclusion Maudlin is searching for is admittedly the refuta-
tion of Price’s major conclusion, namely the statement that time 
objectively flows. What motivates this conclusion, acting as the minor 
premise of his modus ponens, is the claim that the direction of flows 
– exemplified by the direction of rivers and clocks – is an objective 
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matter of fact. The major premise connecting this claim to the above 
conclusion is, accordingly, the statement that the direction of flows is 
objective only if time objectively flows. By contrast, the modus 
tollens which Maudlin attributes to Price is the one whose major 
premise is the same as the major premise of Maudlin’s modus ponens, 
whose minor premise is the negation of its conclusion, and whose 
conclusion is the negation of its minor premise: since the direction of 
flows is objective only if time flows objectively, but this is not the 
case, then flows have no objective direction. 
However, this is still not Price’s argument. So, what relation does 
the above modus tollens bear to Price’s argumentation and, in par-
ticular, where does its major premise come from? Let us go back to 
Price’s own assumptions and let us notice that, due to statement (3), 
the direction of flows is objectively determined only if the positive 
direction of the temporal axis, to which the former is necessarily 
referred, is objective in its turn. In accordance to (4), this obtains just 
in case the future direction of time, which is conventionally identified 
with its positive direction, is objectively distinguished from the past; 
but, according to (5), this can only be done by the objective flow of 
time. Taken together, statements (3)-(5) accordingly amount to the 
statement that the direction of flows is objective only if the flow of 
time is, which is precisely the major premise of Maudlin’s modus 
ponens. 
The modus tollens Maudlin refers to is, therefore, the one having 
as its major premise the conjunction of statements (3)-(5) and as its 
minor premise the negation of statement (1): in other words, it is the 
argument leading from the conclusion of the no-direction argument 
to the corollary that no flow is objectively oriented in time. Maudlin’s 
strategy is thus the following: taking the empirical force of the direc-
tionality of flows as a proof of their objectivity, and then turning the 
sign of the above argument upside down, invoking the objective 
directionality of flows to reaffirm the objectivity of the flow of time. 
Unfortunately, this strategy fails in two different respects. 
In the first place, a supporter of Price’s view could easily reply 
that, being the flow of time merely mind- dependent, there is simply 
no objective matter of fact about whether flows take place in one 
direction rather than the other – or, at the very least, that the sole 
appearance of the temporal orientation of flows is no sufficient reason 
to guarantee its mind-independence. The onus of proving the con-
trary, on the other hand, would lie entirely on Maudlin’s side. 
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In the second place, the very strategy of turning the above men-
tioned modus tollens into a modus ponens would lead Maudlin back 
into the logical trap of the no-direction argument. In fact, changing 
the sign of the modus tollens would evidently demand retaining its 
major premise, i.e. the conjunction of hypotheses (3)-(5); and, on the 
other hand, in speaking of ‘the asymmetry inherent in the passage of 
time’, Maudlin is evidently subscribing to premise (2). So, in turning 
the modus tollens upside down, Maudlin is merely reaffirming (1) 
while still endorsing all of the auxiliary assumptions of the no-
direction argument, with the inevitable consequence of falling into a 
vicious circularity. 
The second of Maudlin’s objections is no less unfortunate: The 
remark about choosing a convention for the ‘positive direction of 
time’ is a red herring: 
It is, of course, merely a convention that our clocks typically count up 
(i.e. indicate larger numbers as time passes) rather than count down. 
Nothing in the nature of the passage of time provides an ‘objective basis’ 
for that choice. A society that happens to build clocks that count down 
rather than up is not making any sort of mistake: attaching numbers to 
moments of time clearly requires purely arbitrary conventions. One 
who believes in the objective passage of time does not think there is an 
objective fact about which sort of clock is counting ‘right’ and which 
‘wrong’, merely that there is an objective fact about which is counting 
up and which down. Up-counting clocks show higher numbers in the 
future direction, down-counting clocks lower numbers. To deny that 
there is an objective distinction between such clocks is to deny that there 
is any objective distinction between the future direction and the past, 
and that is precisely to beg the question (Maudlin 2007: 114-115). 
Of course choosing up-counting clocks, rather than down-counting 
clocks, is a matter of pure convention. The problem, however, is that 
such a convention, by itself, falls short of determining what clocks are 
up-counting and what are not: for, unless the increasing or positive 
direction of time is established, there is simply no way to determine 
whether a clock is moving forward rather than backward in time, and 
hence no way to determine whether that clock is assigning higher 
numbers to increasing times, rather than the converse. 
Maudlin is only entitled to claim that there is an ‘objective distinc-
tion’ between up-counting clocks and down-counting clocks because 
he takes it for granted that it is ‘an objective matter of fact’ about 
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what clocks are counting up and what clocks are counting down. But, 
in doing so, he is assuming the objectivity of the direction of flows or 
motions, just as he did in his former objection. In consequence, all of 
the shortcomings we encountered in the previous case equally apply 
to the present one. 
In sum, Maudlin’s attempts to reject Price’s argument fail because 
he never puts its premises into serious question. However, the weak-
ness of the no-direction argument lies precisely in the ultimate conse-
quences of its basic assumptions, as we are now going to see. 
Escaping the No-Direction Argument 
Looking to the premises of Price’s argument at a finer level, we 
observe that hypothesis (2) is a special case of a more general state-
ment, namely 
(2a) Everything which flows objectively, objectively flows in a certain 
direction. 
What consequences does this statement bear for Price’s argumenta-
tion? Replacing hypothesis (2) with (2a) would leave the logical 
structure of Price’s argument substantially unaltered; but at the same 
time, it would also lead to extremely implausible consequences. For, 
as we saw, it is a corollary of Price’s argument that no flow is objec-
tively oriented in time; and, given (2a), this would straightforwardly 
entail the untenable claim that no flow is, in the end, objective. 
Flows, as well as any other form of motion, consist in something 
being located at contiguous places at contiguous times. The direction 
of flows, instead, is determined by the location of the flowing objects 
at subsequent or increasing times. In order to deny the objectivity of 
the direction of flows, one is therefore only required to deny that 
times are objectively ordered according to the relation of subse-
quence, which is as much as denying the objectivity of the positive or 
increasing direction of the time axis. Denying the objectivity of flows, 
instead, demands rejecting this simple and basic fact: that time is 
objectively composed of different instants or moments, that space is 
objectively composed of different places, and that the spatial location 
of physical objects may vary from time to time in a continuous fash-
ion, independently of human cognition. Except for the radical ideal-
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ist, no one would presumably dare to endorse this extreme position – 
even if, like Price, she denied the objectivity of the direction of flows. 
Of course, assuming (2) does not ipso facto commits one to assum-
ing (2a). So, why should a supporter of Price’s argument endorse the 
latter? We saw that a supporter of Price’s view would be willing to 
admit that objective flows may nonetheless have no objective direc-
tion, so why could not she retain premise (2), while rejecting (2a)? 
The point is that, in doing so, she would fall victim of a double stan-
dard. For, once (2a) were relaxed, what would compel us to accept 
(2)? If we conceded that some objective flows existed which had no 
objective direction, what would prevent us from conceding that the 
same could be true of time?1 
If (2a) were false, assuming the truth of (2) would introduce a sub-
stantial disparity between the flow of time and those flows which, 
albeit objective, had no objective direction. However, it is a basic 
prerequisite for the efficacy of Price’s argument that the directional 
properties of the flow of time were in all similar to those of all other 
flows: for otherwise, one would be simply allowed to invoke the 
exceptional nature of the flow of time to reject one or more of the 
given premises. For example, one may simply maintain that, contrary 
to all other flows, the direction of the flow of time could be estab-
lished without making prior reference to the positive direction of the 
time axis, in which case no vicious circularity would obtain. Price 
himself implicitly admits this, while claiming that ‘[i]f time flowed, 
then – as with any flow – it would only make sense to assign that flow a 
direction with respect to a choice as to what is to count as a positive 
direction of time’. 
So it seems that those who subscribe to Price’s argument are faced 
with an insoluble dilemma: either accepting (2a), this way admitting 
that flows are no objective matter of fact, or rejecting it, this way 
 
1 Let me emphasize that this is not intended to mean that a supporter of Price’s 
position should necessarily be committed with (2): in a recent work on the flow of 
time, Price 2011 explicitly relaxes that assumption, separating the issue of the 
objectivity of the flow of time from the one of its direction, and arguing independ-
ently against each of them. This certainly shows that there exist further reasons to 
doubt that the flow of time is objective, which are independent of premise (2); 
however, the fact remains that assuming (2), at least as a working hypothesis, is 
vital for the sake of the argument which is presently under discussion. 
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conceding that the flow of time has some exceptional features and so 
undermining the logical strength of their own argument. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, let me now briefly summarize the results of my discus-
sion. In the first place I have shown that, given the mind-dependence 
of the flow of time, the set of assumptions underlying Price’s argu-
ment leads to the corollary claim that the direction of flows is in no 
case objective. Then, I have argued that Maudlin’s objections fail 
because they only focus on this corollary, leaving the logical premises 
of Price’s argument untouched. Finally I have pointed out that, given 
such premises, one is either doomed to deny the objectivity of flows 
themselves, or to regard the flow of time as sui generis, this way 
renouncing one of the fundamental presupposition of the argument 
under discussion. In no way, of course, these results may possibly aim 
to settle the question about the objectivity of the flow of time. How-
ever, they certainly leave those who argue against it with one weapon 
less.*2 
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